What Dewey number fits?

In an article entitled Here's looking at you - should we worry about the rise of the drone? in the 14 May 2012 issue of the New Yorker, Peter W. Singer, "a fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of Wired for War, a book about military robotics, is quoted.

His book is in various libraries, but not my two. However, I found the record in the Nassau OPAC rather curious. Of the 15 libraries that do have it, all but two have classified it as military and nautical engineering, 623 in the Dewey Decimal System (623.04 S). Two others have classified it military science (355.0201 S).

350 is Public Administration
620 is Engineering & Applied operations

Boost for Army library

Saw this article in the ALA newsletter. The newspaper is from Petersburg, VA.

FORT LEE - The Army Logistics University Library officially accepted one of the most comprehensive collections of logistical documentation ever donated to an Army professional development school. Retired Lt. Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis donated a collection he has had in his possession since the end of the Persian Gulf War. The documents, reports and videos detail the logistics behind the war effort known as Operation Desert Storm.

"Every briefing, every interview was taped," Pagonis said during the ceremony yesterday. "I was hoping that by doing that, we wouldn't make the same mistakes twice."


Pagonis said that in his role as the chief logistician under Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he asked several historians within the National Guard and Army Reserve to document the operations. Those operations in 1990 and 1991 included bringing equipment to the area, moving two divisions behind enemy lines and setting up logistics stations. The moves were some of the largest ever accomplished by an Army. Pagonis said he even drew on history to make the moves possible with the logistics stations. The inspiration for that came from antiquity.


"Alexander the Great would leave logistics camps as he conquered the known world at that time so that he didn't have to go very far back for supplies," Pagonis said.

He added that Schwarzkopf asked if there were more modern examples, to which Pagonis cited the British in the North African campaign of World War II. Pagonis said that while the British faced defeat through most of that campaign, they kept their supplies close at hand. German Gen. Edwin Rommell did not and ended up losing the campaign. For the U.S. in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there was a seven-month buildup to the 100-hour war.

"It was one of the greatest coups in history," Pagonis said. "Logistics is what made it work."

One of Napoleon's great mistakes was moving into territories with no supply planning; bad logistics.

He added that of all the casualties suffered, approximately two-thirds were logisticians. Pagonis said that the records were never his. "I was just holding on to them," he said of the documents, maps and tapes.

John Shields, research librarian at Army Logistics University, said that because Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield were such important operations, it's good to have primary documents. "In these operations, he really made logistics come together," Shields said. Shields added that the Army Logistics Library has never had anything like this donated or added to its collection before. "We're very excited about it."

Maj. Gen. James E. Chambers said that he's hopeful the library will soon have other important document collections added to it, perhaps from other wars such as World War II. Shields said that the library is still formulating how the documents will be added to the catalog. As part of the special collections, all the items will be able to be used by students at the Army Logistics University and members of the public who wish to do research.

"We won't let it circulate though," Shields said.

MacArthur's Reputation

The Question of MacArthur's Reputation
By Robert H. Ferrell
(University of Missouri Press, 111 pages, $19.95)

In an attack that Douglas MacArthur bragged about, and for which he received a medal, an important breakthrough was made on the Hindenburg Line.

MacArthur's heroism on the Châtillon soon became part of his legend and, in the coming decades, figured prominently in his biography. Within weeks of the breakthrough he was bragging about it.

Yes, this is the army man who defied his Commander-in-Chief, President Truman, the very same army man who insisted a line of nuclear weapons be drawn across the Korean Peninsula in order to slow down the Communists. Turns out that Douglas MacArthur was a blowhard. It was not just the liberals thought so; it was the truth. Spin control managed to suppress the truth for decades, but not forever.

MacArthur never fought shy of the limelight – and history has forgiven him, not least because of his heroic leadership in World War II and the Korean War. Yet it is shocking to learn that he wasn't actually present on the Côte de Châtillon on Oct. 16 and that he didn't lead his men through the wire; he was back at a command post behind the lines.

Thus, his words that division commanders must instill 'the fighting spirit' into their commands by personal presence and example' were empty. He lied.

I have long wondered just how heroic this Army officer really was; he seemed very much an usurper, a blowhard, a manipulator. Long ago I read that the well-known (I refuse to call it famous) landing in the Philippines that fulfilled his I shall return pronouncement was staged: he had the photographer take the shot again, so that he would look appropriately heroic. The thesis of this book seems to agree with that judgement.

The attack was led by two exceptional officers: Maj. Lloyd D. Ross and Lt. Col. Walter E. Bare. They instilled the "fighting spirit" in the 167th and 168th Regiments, and they rallied the lines. It is they who deserve the credit that MacArthur claimed for himself.

And his reputation was based on stolen credit. What kind of honor is that?

This extraordinary falsehood is the impetus for Robert H. Ferrell's "The Question of MacArthur's Reputation." Having written widely before on the Meuse-Argonne campaign, Mr. Ferrell was bothered by the contradictions in the accounts of Châtillon. He delved into the archives and, in this rigorously researched and densely constructed historical essay, demolishes MacArthur's pretensions. It isn't just that the general stole credit. When his men failed to take the Châtillon on Oct. 14, he ordered them on a suicidal bayonet assault, at night, against fortified positions. The protests of Ross and Bare saw the order countermanded, which probably saved MacArthur's career.

Reckless, too, not just a liar.

Mr. Ferrell makes little attempt to explain MacArthur's actions. He notes that Gen. John Pershing, the leader of the American Expeditionary Force, badly needed a victory. His first two attacks in the Argonne had failed dismally and the third was failing when Strom and his men sprang open the Dame Marie. MacArthur's regiments then gave the AEF a taste of success. MacArthur was a dashing and convenient hero. As the commanding officer, though, he would have enjoyed a large part of the glory even without claiming to have led the assault itself. Legends are made on the battlefield, where facts are often hard to establish. Mr. Ferrell has established a big one – that, in this case, MacArthur lied. It is up to future biographers to sort out what such a fantasy means to a soldier's reputation.

And I wonder how often this victory of MacArthur's is included in biographies?